University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions

The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection

6-11-1954

Richards v. Stanley
Roger J. Traynor

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, Richards v. Stanley 43 Cal.2d 60 (1954).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/767

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

60

RICHARDS V. STANLEY

[43 C.2li

(8. F. No. 18941. In Bank. June 11,1954.]

ROBERT RICHARDS, Appellant, v. MANFRED STANLEY
et ai., Respondents.
[1] Negligence-Violation of Statute or Ordinance-PersoJUI Intended to be Beneflted.-A person may not recover damages
based OD violation of a criminal statute or ordinance unless
he is one of class of persons for whose benefit statute or ordinance was enacted.
[2] Automobiles-Evidence-Ordinances.-In action for personal
injurIes sustamed when automobile driven by thief and owned
by defendants struck motorcycle on which plaintiff was riding,
ordinance requiring removal of ignition keys from noncommercIal motor vehicle standing unattended in certain places is
properly excluded as irrelevant. althougb complaint alleged
that defendants' negligence in leaving vehicle "unattended
and unlocked with the ignition key ,n said car lock" induced
thief to take car, where ordinance specially provides that it
shall have no bearing in any civil action, thereby making it
olear that ordinance was not enacted. for benefit of persons
who might be injured by operation of stolen automobiles.
[3] Negligence-Elements-Duty to Person Injured.-An indispensable factor to liability found~d on negligence is existence
of a duty of care owed by alleged wrongdoer to person injured,
or to class of which he is a mf'mber.
[4] Automobiles-Persons Liable.-In absence of statute prohibiting the leaving of key in an unattended vehicle on public street,
owner ot automobile is ordinarily under no duty to persons
who may be injured by its use to keep it out of hands of a third
person in absence of facts putting owner on notice that third
person is incompetent to handle it.
[6] Id.-Persons Liable.- While there is a foreseeable risk of negligent driving whenever anyone drives himself or lends his
ear to another, such risk 18 not considered so unreasonable that
an owner is negligent merely because he drives himself or lends
his car to another in absence of knowledge on his part of his
own or the other's incompetence.
[a] Negligence-Elements-Dnt}' to Third Person.-Ordinarily, in
absence of a special relatIOnship between the parties, there is
no duty to control conduct of a third person so as to prevent
him from causing harm to another, and this rule is applicable

[1] See Ca1.Jur., Negligence, § 66; Am.Jur., Negligence, § 165.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Negligence, § 92: [2] Automobiles,
§ 208; [3, 6] NegIigence, § 5; [4, 5, 1] Automobiles, §159; [8]
Negligence, I 150.
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in eases in which third person's conduct is maue post;ible only
because defendant has relinquished control of his property to
third person, at least if defendant has no reason to believe
that third person is incompetent to manage it.
[71 Automobiles-Persons Liable.-In view of fact that risk of
negligent drIving which automobile owner creates by leaving
car unattended with ignitIOn key In car lock is less than risk
she might intentionally have created without negligence by
entrusting her car to another, and in view of rule that she owes
no duty to protect plaintiff from harm resulting from activities
of thIrd persons, her duty to exercise reasonable care in man·
agement of her automobile does not encompass a duty to protect plaintiff from negligent driving of a thief.
[81 Negligence-Questions of Law and Fact.-When existence of
a duty rests on reasonable foreseeability of injury to plaintiff,
it may become primarily a question for jury unless reasonable
minds cannot differ, and necessarily involved in submitting
ease to jury is a preliminary determinatioJl that, granted a
foreseeable risk, a duty arises.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco. L L. Harris, Judge.
Affirmed.
Action for damages for personal injuries arising out of a
eollision of vehicles. Judgment of nonsuit affirmed.
Frank J. Baumgarten and Harry N. Grover for Appellant.
Clark & Heafey, Edwin A. Heafey, Gerald P. Martin and
Belcher & Koller for Respondents.

t ..

TRA YNOR, J.-Plaintitf brought this action to recover
damages for personal injuries suffered when his motorcycle
, collided with an automobile owned by defendants Mr. and Mrs.
tStanley, which was being driven at the time by a thief, defendant Rawlings. The complaint alleged that Mr. and Mrs.
r Stanley were the owners of an automobile, which Mrs. Stanley
parked on Stevenson Street near Second Street in San Fran'cisco, leaving it "unattended and unlocked with the ignition
. key in said car lock" in violation of section 69 of the municipal
code ;. that as a result of this carelessness. defendant Rawlings

~-'------------------------------------------------." See. 69. Requiring removal of iU"itioll key, from II011commercial

" _~or vehicle standillg unattended ill certain places, authorizing officer.
remove. No persoD shall leave a motor vehicle, except a commercial
motor nhicle, uDattended OD aDJ' .treet, alley, used car lot, 01' unattended

f.'P
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"was thereby induced to and did enter said automobile and
drove it from its parking place ••• into the intersection of
Army Street and Potrero Avenue in a careless and negligent
manner to the point of impact" with plaintiff's vehicle; that
the accident occurred at about 5 :30 p. m. of said day when
the Stanleys' car driven by Rawlings struck plaintiff as he
was driving his motorcycle, throwing him to the pavement;
and that "by reason of the premises and the aforesaid carelessness and negligence of the defendants and each of them,
there was inflicted upon plaintiff serious personal injuries."
The Stanleys' general demurrer was overruled, and they
answered denying the allegations of the complaint and pleading contribntory negligence. At the start of the trial plaintiff
offered municipal code section 89 in evidence, but the trial
conrt excluded it. Plaintiff then sought leave to amend his
complaint to state a cause of action for general negligence,
but leave to amend was denied. The court then sustained
the Stanleys' objection to the introduction of any evidence
against them on the ground that the complaint failed to state
a eause of action and granted their motion for a nonsuit.
Plaintiff has appealed.
Although the ordinance provides that it shall not be admissible in evidence or have any other bearing in any civil action,
plaintiff contends that it may nevertheless be relied upon
as a basis for liability. He bases this contention on the theory
that a city ordinance may not validly control the rules of
evidence applicable in the courts and that the provision purporting to do so is severable from the remainder of the ordinance. [1] A person may not recover damages based upon
the violation of a criminal statute or ordinance, however, unless
he is one of the class of persons for whose benefit the statute or
ordinance was enacted. (Nunf&6Zey v. Edgar HoteZ, 36 Ca1.2d
493, 497 [225 P.2d 497]; Routh v. Quinn, 20 Ca1.2d 488,
491-492 [127 P.2d 1, 149 A.L.R. 215].) [2] By providing
that the ordinance should have no bearing in any civil action,
the board of supervisors made clear that the ordinance was
parking lot, without llrat atopping the engine, ad removing and taking
the ignition key from the vehicle; provided, however, that any violation
of this section shall not mitigate the offense of Itealing ay luch motor
vellicle; nor shall this section or any violation thereof be adruillible as
evidence affecting recovery in any civil action for theft of IIl1ch motor
vehicle, or the insurance thereon, or have any other bearing in any
civil action. Whenever any police otllcer shall find any 8uch motor vehicle
standing in violation of thil section, such police officer is authorized
to remove therefrom the keys left therein Rnd deliver the same to the
otlleer in char,e of the nearest police .tatioa."
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not euaded r\)r the bellefit of 1)('rstlllS whll Il1i:~ht be injured
by the operation of stuleu automobiles, and accordingly,
whether or not it could validly affect the admissibility of
evidence, it was properly excluded as irrelevant.
Plaintiff contends that even if the ordinance is disregarded,
his complaint states a cause of action for negligence against
Mrs. Stanley. He relies on the allegations that as a result
of her negligence and carelessness in leaving the car unattended
on a public street with the key in it, Rawlings was induced
to steal the ear, and that thereafter his negligent driving
resulted in injuring plaintiff. It may be conceded at the
outset that the leaving of the key in the car parked on a public
street constituted negligence on the part of Mrs. Stanley
toward her own and her husband's proprietary interests in the
automobile, and that the intervening act of the thief in steal·
ing the car would not insulate Mrs. Stanley from responsi.
bility for her negligence toward such interests. (See Restate·
ment, Torts, §§ 447, 449.) [3] As the court stated in Routh
v. Quinn, 20 Ca1.2d 488, 491 [127 P.2d I, 149 A.L.R. 215],
however, "It is an elementary principle that an indispensable
factor to liability founded upon negligence is the existence
of a duty of care owed by the alleged wrongdoer to the person
injured, or to a class of which he is a member." (See also
McEvoy v. American Pool Oorp., 32 Ca1.2d 295, 298 [195
\ P.2d 783] ; Rest., Torts, § 281 (a), (b), comments c, e, g.)
Accordingly, it is necessary to consider the scope of the duty
of the owner of an automobile to control his property for
the protection of persons on the public streets.
Given a statute prohibiting the leaving of the key in an
unattended vehicle on the public street, it could reasonably
be contended that the Legislature had established a duty on
the part of motorists to protect persons on the streets from
any damage caused by thieves driving stolen automobiles.
(See ROBB v. Hartman, 78 App.D.C. 217 [139 F.2d 14, 15,
158 A.L.R. 1370]; Ney v. Yellow Oab 00., 2 Il1.2d 74
[117 N.E.2d 74, 77-78] ; Ostergard v. Frisch, 333 Ill.App. 359
[77 N.E.2d 537, 539].) [4] In the absence of such a statute,
however, it has generally been held that the owner of an automobile is under no duty to persons who may be injured by
its use to keep it out of the hands of a third person in the
absence of facts putting the owner on notice that the third
person is incompetent to handle it. (Baugh v. RogerB, 24 Cal.2d
200,214 [148 P.2d 633, 152 A.L.R. 1043J ; Lane v. Bing, 202
Cal. 590, 592 [262 P. 318] ; Perry v. Sime<m6, 197 Cal. 132,
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1:.J8 [23!l P. 1056\; Illtl·/kr v. 1,C1'(,lIs/atl/. l!"H) Cal. 681, 688
fiR9 [2]4 r. 42) ; MrCnJla v. Grn.~.~e, 12 CIlI.App.2d 546, 550
[109 P.2d 358]; Brown v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 39 Cal.App.
738, 741 [179 P. 697]. See also Kiste v. Red Cab, Inc .. 122
Ind.App.587 [106 N.E.2d 395,398] ; Castay v. Katz & Besthoff, Ltd., (La.App.) 148 So. 76, 78; Galbraith v. Levin, 323
Mass. 255 [81 N.E.2d 560, 564]; Anderson v. Theisen, 231
Minn. 369 [43 N.W.2d 272, 273] ; c/., Johnstone v. Panama
Pac. I. E. Co., 187 Cal. 323, 329-330 [202 P. 34]; Rest.,
Torts, § 390.)
Plaintiff contends, however, that since both theft and
negligent driving on the part of the thief were foreseeable
consequences of leaving the key in the car, Mrs. Stanley
created an unreasonable risk to persons on the streets and
was therefore negligent toward him. He relies upon N ey v.
Yellow Cab Co., 2 Hl.2d 74 [117 N.E.2d 74, 79], where
the court stated: "The increase in population and number
of motor vehicles owned and operated in this country in the
past few years is well known. The increase of casualties from
traffic accidents is a matter of common knowledge and concern. The incidence of automobile thefts and damages and
injuries resulting from such larcenous escapades has accordingly increased. Juvenile delinquency has reached proportions alarming to everyone. Three major wars during the
lifetime of this generation have had their effect upon the
mental attitudes, not only upon those who endured the
physical suffering and mental anguish, but upon all our
society. Comparative regard and disregard for the rights
and property of others have not been unaffected. Automobiles,
once considered a luxury, are now considered by many to be
a necessity. The man who once walked a mile now drives a
block. The speed and power of automobiles have increased
to the extent that safety experts are now showing keen
awareness of their potentials even in the hands of rightful
owners and careful operators. Incidents of serious havoc
caused by runaway thieves or irresponsible juveniles in stolen
or 'borrowed' motor vehicles frequently shock the readers
of the daily press. With this background must come a recognition of the probable danger of reSUlting injury consequent
to permitting a motor vehicle to become casily available to
an unauthorized person through violation of the statute in
question. " These considerations were nndonbtedly persuasivl' in motivating the Illinois Legislature to paAA a statute
prohibiting owners from leaving keys in their unattended

June 1954]

RICHARDS V. STANLEY

r43

65

C.2d 60: 271 P.2d 231

\'phi('lf'N alld in lI'adill:.! tI ... IlIillfllN
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stru(' tllf' Nfalutf' II" fill" illl(,IId,'" for thc'llO'lwtil fit' 11f'I"NOnli who
might be illjlll"rrl by thr op('ration of stolrn ears. In the
absence of statute, howe\'er, we do not feel that they justify
the recognition ofa duty on the part of car owners to protl'ct
the public from till' risk of the motoring activities of thieves,
when to do so would result in imposing greater liability than
is now provided by statutI' when the owner voluntarily en·
trusts his car to another. (S(>e Veh. Code, § 402.)
The problem is not answered by pointing out that there is a
foreseeable risk of negligent driving on the part of thievl's.
[5] There is a fore~eable risk of negligent driving whenever
anyone drives himself or lends his car to another. That risk
has not been considered so unreasonable, however, that an
ownl'r is negligent merely because he drives himself, or lends
his car to another, in the absence of knowledge on his part of
his own or the other's incompetence. Moreover, by leaving
t.he key in the car the owner does not assure that it will be
driven, as he does when he lends it to another. At most he
creates a risk that it will be stolen and driven. The risk that
it will be negligently driven is thus materially less than in
the case in which the owner entrusts his car to another for
the very purpose of the latter's use.
In one sense the problem presented involves the duty of
the owner of an automobile so to manage it as not to create
an unreasonable risk of harm to others. It bears emphasis,
howeyer, that when Mrs. Stanley left the car it was in a
position where it could harm no one, and no harm occurred
until it had been taken by a thief. Thus a duty to prevent
such harm would involve more than just the duty to control
the car, it would involve a duty to prevent action of a
third person. [6] Ordinarily, however, in the absence of a
special relationship between the parties, there is no duty to
control the conduct of a third person so as to prevent him from
causing harm to another. (Lane v. Bing, 202 CaL 590, 592
[262 P. 318] j see Ellis v. D'Angelo, 116 Cal.App.2d 310, 317
[253 P.2d 675] j Rest., Torts, § 315; Harper and Kime, The
Duty to Oontrol the Oonduct 0/ Another, 43 Yale L.J. 886.)
Moreover, this rule is applicable even in cases in which the third
person's conduct is made possible only because the defendant
has reliilquish('d control of his property to the third person,
at least if the defendant has no reason to believe that the
third person is incompetent to manage it. Thus, as noted
above. an Automobile owner is not ordinarily negligent if
a C.2d-l

I
)
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hI' 1(,!Hls his \'.;Ir III Ilnotllf'r; I'x""1-'1 ill "l'rt.ain l>lJl'cial eircumstances, a I('xxor may rely on his 1('88('(' to discharge the duty
to maintain the premises in reasonably safe condition for the
benefit of persons entitled to such protection (see Restatement,
Torts, §§ 355-362; Goodmatl v. Harris, 40 Ca1.2d 254, 261, 265
[253 P.2d 447]); and a supplier of lumber is entitled to
assume that a building contractor will not negligently selE'et
an obviously defective piece of lumber to use as a support
for a scaffold. (Stultz v. Benson Lbr. Co., 6 Cal.2d 688,
694-695 [59 P.2d 100].)
In the present case Mrs. Stanley did not leave her car in
front of a school where she might reasonably expect irresponsible children to tamper with it (see Restatement, Torts,
§ 302, illus. 7), nor did she leave it in charge of an intoxicated
passenger as did defendant in Morris v. Bolling, 31 Tenn.
App. 577 [218 S.W.2d 754]. By leaving the key in her car
she at most increased the risk that it might be stolen. Even
if she should have foreseen the theft, she had no reason to
believe that the thief would be an incompetent driver. [7] In
view of the fact that the risk of negligent driving she created
was less than the risk she might intentionally have created
without negligence by entrusting her car to another, and in
the light of the rule that she owed no duty to protect plaintiff
from harm rE'sulting from the activities of third persons, we
conclude that her duty to exercise reasonable care in the
management of her automobile did not encompass a duty to
protect plaintiff from the negligent driving of a thief.
Plaintiff contends, however, that reasonable minds might
differ as to whether or not Mrs. Stanley was negligent toward
him, and that accordingly, the question must be submitted
to the jury. In McEvoy v. American Pool Corp., 32 Cal.2d
295, 298 [195 P.2d 783], the court pointed out that, "The
conclusion that certain conduct is negligent involves the find·
ing both of a legal duty to use due care and a breach of
such duty by the creation of an unreasonable risk of harm."
[8] When, as in the McEvoy case, the existence of a duty
rests on the reasonable foreseeability of injury to the plaintiff, it may become primarily a question for the jury unles!'!
reasonable minds cannot differ. Necessarily involved in submitting the case to the jury, hcwever, is a preliminary determination that, granted a foreseeable >:isk, a duty arises.
On the other hand, there are many situation!'! involving- fores{'('able risks where therc is no duty. Thus in ROllth v. Quinn.
20 Ca1.2u 488 [127 P.2U I, 149 A.L.R. 215J, although the tax
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assessor could reasonably have foreseen that his rlTor ill COlli·
putation. would invaliilate a tax sale to the purchaSt~l"S detri·
ment, the court held that the assessor was under no dut~; to
the purchaser to exercise due care in his computations. De·
terminations of the duty issue as a matter of law adversely
to the plaintiff are particularly common in situations similar
to that in the present case, in whieh the defendant's responsi.
bility for the activities of third persons is involved. Thus in
Lane v. Bing, supra, 202 Cal. 590, it was held in the absence
of statute that as a matter of law a parent was not liable for
the negligent driving of the parent's car by his minor chilrl
in the absence of a showing that the child was an incompetent
driver. Similarly, in Goodman v. Harris, 40 Ca1.2d 254 [253
P.2d 44'/], it was held that a lensor was not liable to a business invitee of bis lessee even though he was aware of a
dangerous condition existing on the premises, could have foreseen injury to visitors, and could have prevented the continuance of the dangerous condition by canceling the lease.
Although in both of the foregoing situations it would be
difficult to say that reasonable minds could not differ as to
whether or not a duty should be imposed, the question was
one of law for the court, and not for the jury, to decide.
Were we to hold that it is for the jury to decide whether
Mrs. Stanley was under a duty to plaintiff to protect him from
the negligent operation of her automobile by a thief, it would
logically follow that in many situations where one person
entrusts his car to another, a jury question would arise as to
whether or not the owner should have foreseen an unreasonable risk to persons on the highway. It is a matter of
,common knowledge that drivers under 25 years of age as a
'class have more accidents than older drivers and that they
'must pay more for insurance. There may be other classes of
. drivers with similar accident experience. Nevertheless, an
. 9wner is not negligent if he entrusts his automobile to a
member of such a class unless he knows or has reason to
believe that the driver is incompetent, and in the absence of
aueb knowledge he is under no common-law duty to protect
third persons from possible misconduct on the part of the
driver. (Lane v. Bing, supra, 202 Cal. 590, 592; Baugh v.
Bogers, supra, 24 Ca1.2d 200, 214; see also Leo v. Dunham.
41 Ca1.2d 712, 715 [264 P.2d 1] ; RodabaulJh v. Teku.~, 39 Cal.
2d 290,294 [246 P.2d 663].)
,It is true that the problem of proterting persons on the
~:bliC highways from the negligent operation of automobiles

,

.~.

i,':"
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by financially irresponsible persons is less arute when the car
is bcing drh'en with the permission of the owner than when
it is being driven by a thief. In the former case negligence
is imputed to the owner under section 402 of the Vehicle
Code. Since the liability under section 402 is limited in
amount, however, the problem of whether or not the owner
is also under a common-law duty in the case of permissive
use is not eliminated by the statute. Moreover. we could not
avoid that problem 'here by adopting a special rule applicable
only to the liability of owners of stolen automobiles without
creating an anomalous situation with respect to the limits of
liability. If such a rule were adopted, a person whose car was
stolen would be subject to unlimited liability, although a
person who entrusted his car to another would be protected
by the $5,000 and $10,000 limits set forth in section 402.
This result would follow although the risk created by the
owner I)f the stolen car by leaving the key therein was materially less than that created by the owner who gave per·
mission to another to use his car. These considerations sug·
gest that the basic problem is really not one of negligence
on the part of the owner, but rather whether or not the
hazards inherent in the use of automobiles are so great that
liability should be imposed on the owner without fault for
any damage done by the operation of his vehicle. The Legislature has imposed such liability within limits by providing
that the negligence of a driver using an automobile with the
express or implied consent of the owner shall be imputed to
the owner. If it is to be extended further it is for the
Legislature and not for the court to do so.
There is nothing in McEvoy v. American Pool Corp., 32
Ca1.2d 295 [195 P.2d 783], and Benton v. Sloss, 38 Ca1.2d
399 [240 P.2d 575], contrary to our conclusion here. Those
cases both held that the negligent driving on the part of a
third person that caused a collision was not such an unforeseeable intervening cause as would relieve the defendant of
liability for his own negligence toward the plaintiff, which
also contributed to the injury. There is a clear distinction,
however, between the problem of foreseeability of intervening
causes in determining whether the defendant's conduct was
the proximate cause of an injury, and the problem of foreseeability in determining whether the defendant was negligent
at all. In the latter case the problem is whether or not the
defendant's conduct was wrongful toward the plaintiff, while
in the former it is whether he should be relieved of responsi-

)
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duct also cOlltl'iblll!~d to thl~ injury. Tlw diffl'rclI(,p in treat.·
ment of these two problems is aptly illustrated by comparing
the rule recently restated in Leo v. Dunham, 41 Cal.2d 712,
715 [264 P.2dl), with the rule applied in the McEvoy and
Benton cases. In the Leo case the court in discussing the
negligence issue stated: .,. The general rule is that every
person has a right to presume that every other person will
perform his duty and obey the law, and in the absence of
reasonable grounds to think otherwise it is not negligent to
/lSsume that he is not exposed to danger which comes to him
only from violation of law or duty by such other person.'
(Harris v. Johnspn, 174 Cal. 55, 58 [161 P. 1155, Ann. Cas.
1918E 560, L.R.A. 1917C 477] . . . )" (See also Rodabaugh
v. Tek1tS, supra, 39 Cal.2d 290, 294; Rest. Torts, §§ 433,447.
4.49.) Thus, although it is clear that under the rule of the
McEvoy and Benton cases, Mrs. Stanley would not be relieved
from liability by the intervening negligent driving of the
thief were she under a duty to protect plaintiff from injury
from that source, since no such duty exists, no problem of
intervening causation arises.
The judgment is affirmed.
Shenk, J., and Edmonds, J., concurred.
SCHAUER, J.-I concur in the judgment on the ground
that defendant was not bound to anticipate that any person
t would steal her car or commit any other crime in respect
, to it, and, accordingly, defendant owed no duty to anyone
growing out of the unlawful taking and operation of the
vehicle.
SPENCE, J.-I dissent.
In my opinion, the complaint was sufficient to state. a
, 'Cause of action for negligence without reference to the alleged
:violation of the ordinance, and the trial court therefore erred
. in granting the motion to exclude any evidence and in grant·
',.ing the motion for nonsuit without taking any evidence.
. It was alleged in the complaint that defendant Mary Stanley,
at about 5 :30 p. m. on the day of the accident, left her auto·
mobile "unattended and unlocked with the ignition key ill
I~aid car lock" on "Stevenson Street, west of Second Street"
in San Francisco; and that "by reason of the carelessness
;' ,and negligent action of the saiel drfrndant, Mary Stanley, in
, leaving the aforesaid automobile unattended on a public
......

I'

70

RrcnARDS

v.

STANLF.Y

st I" "I' t , 111110c](cd, with IlII' l,<,y in said lod, ... the' .h'feudallt
Hnlll'rt J. Rawlillgs was tlwl"eby induced to and did, entpl'

said automobile and drove it frol1l its parked place over various streets" ill San Francisco "in a careless and negligent
manner to the point of impact ... " with plaintiff 's vehicl~.
It was further alleged that the collision occurrc-d at Arm~'
Street and Potrero A venue in San Francicco at about 5 :4S
p. m. of said day, and that defendant Rawlings then and
there so carelessly and negligently operated said automobile
as to cause said collision; and that by reason of "the afore·
said carelessness ami negligence of the defendants and each
of them" serious injuries were inflicted upon plaintiff.
The charging allegations of the complaint therefore appear
sufficient as against defendant Mary Stanley, unless it llIay be
said as a matter of law that they were insufficient to show a
violation by defendant Mary Stanley of a duty of care owing
to persons lawfully using the streets, or unless it may be said
as a matter of law that, assuming a showing of a violation of
a duty of care toward persons lawfully using the streets, they
were insufficient to show that such violation was a proximate
cause of the injuries to plaintiff. I do not believe that it may
be said as a matter of law that said allegations were insufficient in either respect. Under these circumstances, the motion
to exclude all evidence should have been denied and the
motion for nonsuit should not have been entertained until
plaintiff had had the opportunity to present his case. Then,
if the evidence presented showed a situation upon which
reasonable minds could differ upon these issues, the motion
for nonsuit should have been denied and the issues should
have been presented to the jury under appropriate instructions.
There is a conflict of authority on the general subject
under discussion in the various jurisdictions. (See cases
collected: Annos. 26 A.L.R. 912; 158 A.L.R. 1374.) Thus,
the owner of a negligently parked car has been absolved from
liability for damages arising from a thief's negligent driving
of the car into plaintiff's vehicle, upon the theory that the
thief's act was the proximate cause of the accident and the
car owner's original negligence was too remote to be connected as a cause therewith. (Kiste v. Red Cab., Inc., 122
Ind.App. 587 [106 N.E.2d 395] ; Castay v. Katz &- Besthoff,
Ltd., (La.App.) 148 So. 76; Galbraith v. Levin, 323 Mass. 255
[81 N.E.2d 560]; A.ndcrson v. Theisen, 231 Minn. 369 [43
N.W.2d 272] j Reti v. Vaniska, Inc., 14 N.J. Super. 94 [81 A.2d
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377]; Wilson v. Harrington, 269 App.Div. 891 [56 N.\' ~:!.]
157], af/'. 295 N.Y. 667 [65 N.E.2d 101].} In similar (·it'I·lIl1lstances the contrary has been held upon the premise tliat
there may be a plurality of causes cooperating to prodllel'
plaintiff's injuries, each of which is sufficient to permit It
jury to impose liability. (Ostergard v. Frisch, 333 IlI.App
359 [77 N.E.2d 537] ; Ney v. Yellow Oab 00.,348 Ill.App 161
[l08 N.E.2d 508] ; Morris v. Bolling, 31 Tenn.App. 577 [218
S.W.2d 754] ; Ross v. Hartman, 78 U.S.App.D.C. 217 [139
F.2d 14, 158 A.L.R. 1370], cert. den. 321 U.S. 790 [64 S.Ct.
790,88 L.Ed. 1080] ; Schaff v. R. W. Olaxton, Inc., 79 U.S,App.
D.C. 207 [144 F.2d 532] ; R. W. Olaxton, Inc. v. Schaff, 83
U.S.App.D.C.217 [169 F.2d 303].)
In RoSl v. Hartman (1943), supra, the owner's employee
violated an ordinance when he left the automobile parked
on the street with the key in the ignition switch. Such violation was deemed negligence per ae and constituted the proximate cause of the injuries to plaintiff, requiring the owner
of the car to respond in damages though the theft of the car
and its negligent operation by the thief had intervened. In
80 holding the court expressly overruled its contrary decision
made 27 years previously (Squires v. Brooks, 44 App.D.C.
320), which had held that the intervening act of a third person
who steals a car absolves the driver who left the keys in the
car from responsibility for a resulting accident. Such decision,
the court said at page 14 (139 F.2d), could not be reconciled "with facts which have become clearer and principles
which have become better established than they were in 1916."
While in the Ross case the court gave controlling effect to the
ordinance as a safety measure designed to prevent children
and thieves from tampering with an unlocked vehicle, the
court, in passing on the problem, pertinently added at page
15 [139 F.2d]: "Everyone knows now that children and
thieves frequently cause harm by tampering with unlocked
cars. The danger that they will do so on a particular occasion
may be slight or great, In the absence of an ordinance, therefore, leaving a car unlocked might not be negligent in some
circumstances, although in other circumstances it might be
both negligent and a legal or • proximate' cause of a resulting
occident." (Emphasis added.)
Then in Schaff v. R. W. Claxton, Inc. (1944), supra, 144
F.2d 532, the same court followed its reasoning in the Ross
case, though it did not involve a violation of the ordinance
through leaving an unlocked car on the street-a .. public
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place." Rather the driver parked the car in a l'Clitaurunt'li
., private parking space," with the key Idt in the ignition
switch. A stranger drove off with the car aud injun'd thc
plaintiffs. Although there was no applicable OrUillltllcC. it
was held that it was a question of fact for the jury as to
whether the negligence of the original driver, combined with
that of the thief, under the circumstances, was the" proximatl'
cause of the accident." (P. 533 [144 F.2d}.) (In accord:
R. W. Claxton, Inc. v. Schaff (1948), supra, 169 F.2d 303.
cert. den. 335 U.S. 871 (69 S.Ct. 168. 93 L.Ed. 415).)
In Illinois there is a split of authority on the subject. There,
as in the District of Columbia, the liability of the owner for
damages by reason of the negligent operation of his car by
a thief is predicated upon the violation of an ordinance setting
up the statutory standard of care to be expected of a reason·
ably prudent man in parking his car. However, contrary to
the rule of the Ross case, in Illinois violation of the ordinance
is not deemed negligence per 8e in fixing the owner's conduct
as the" legal cause" of the harm to plaintiff. but is only prima
facie evidence of negligence. (Johnson v. Pendergast, 308
Ill. 255 [139 N.E. 407].) Whether the primary negligence
of the owner of the car is the proximate cause of the accident
is governed by the customary rule in tort cases. (Ostergard
v. Frisch (1948), supra, 77 N.E.2d 537, 541.) ThllS in the
Ostergard case it was held that the theft and subsequent
ncgligent operation of the car by the thief in the course of
flight were reasonably foreseeable risks of leaving a car standing unattended with the key in the ignition switch, which
risks must be guarded against at the owner's peril. Then
in Cockrell v. Sttllivan (1951), 344 IlI.App. 620 [101 N.E.2d
878], the court specifically repudiated the reasoning of the
Ostergard case and held, citing the dissent in that case, that
as a matter of law, the thief's negligent use of the stolen car
broke the chain of causation between the primary negligence
of the owner of the car and the subsequent accident to plain·
tiff. However, in Ney v. Yellow Cab Co. (1952), supra, 108
N.E.2d 508, the court reaffirmed the foreseeability rule as
applied in the Ostergard case and expressly held that the issue
of the car owner's liability, or more precisely the question of
proximate cause. wa.'1 for the jury's determination. Whether
a reasonable man should have foreseen that leaving his car
on the street nnattendt'tl. with the key in the ignition" would
probably result in !'lOtnt'OIW stealing it, and, while in flight.
driving it negligently into plaintiff's automobile" and whether
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,lit' tit il'f 's "1"'"pOIlSP. to the Nituatioll "rl'ated" by the negligent parking of thp ear was normal 01' "extraordinary _ ..
so as to be or not to be the proximate eause of the injury"
that followed were questions of which" reasonable men might
differ" and so "for the jury." (lOS N.E.2d 511; see also
.iforns v Bolling (Tenn.App. 1948). supra, 2]S S.W.2d
754. 75S.)
The above mentioned split in authority in Illinois has now
been resolved since the Supreme Court of Illinois. during the
pendency of this appeal, has decided the case of N ey v.
Yellow Cab Co., 2 Ill.2d 74 [117 N.E.2d 74], affirming the
judgment of the First District Appellate Court in Ney v.
Yellow Cab Co., supra, lOS N.E.2d 50S.
The precise question here presented has not been decided
in this state. H0w..ever, the subject of intervening acts has
been considered by this court in several recent cases. In
Eads v. Marks, 39 Ca1.2d S07. this court said at page 812
[249 P.2d 257]: "Where the intervening act is reasonably
foreseeable. the chain of causation is not broken, and the
original actor remains liable. (Mosley v. Arden Farms Co.,
26 Ca1.2d 213 r157 P.2d 372, 15S A.L.R. 872]; Osborn v.
City of Whittier, 103 Cal.App.2d 609 [230 P.2d 132].)"
In McEvoy v. American Pool Corp., 32 Ca1.2d 295, 298-299
[195 P.2d 7S3], the following rules from the Restatement of
Torts with respect to proximate causation were cited with approval. Section 447: "The fact that an intervening act of a
third person is negligent in itself or is done in a negligent
manner does not make it a superseding c'ause of harm to an·
other which the actor's negligent conduct is a substantial
factor in bringing about, if (a) the actor at the time of his
negligent conduct should have realized that a third person
might so act." Section 449: .. If the realizable likelihood
that a third person may act in a particular manner is the
hazard or one of the hazards which make the actor negligent.
such an act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious
or criminal does not prevent the actor from being liable for
harm caused thereby. " Section 453, comMent (a): "If the
facts are undisputed, it is usually the duty of the court to
apply to them any rule which determines the existence or
extent of the negligent actor's liability. If, however, the
negligent character of the third person'8 intervening act or
the reasonable foreseeability of its being done is a factor in
determining whether the intervening act relieve!; the actor
from liability for his antecedent negligence, and under the
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undisputed facts there is room for reasonable difference or
opinion as to whether such act was negligent or foreseeable,
the question should be left to the jury." (Emphasis added.)
In the McEvoy case, Jack McEvoy was employed by the
defendant corporation as a service man. In making his
weekly calls for the servicing of swimming pools, he used
his own car, being paid for its use by the company. His work
required that he carry in his car "highly dangerous" chemicals as part of the service equipment. One night while off
duty his car was struck by a hit-and-run driver and overturned, the impact causing certain glass jars to break, with
the result that the chemicals therein burned his mother, who
was riding with him. A nonsuit was granted in her action
against the company. In reversing the judgment, this court
said at page 299: "In the light of the foregoing [the above
Restatement rules] we cannot say, as a matter of law, that
defendants are relieved from liability for negligence by the
intervening conduct of their employee or the hit-and-run
driver ••• the jury could have found that defendants owed
a duty to persons in plaintiff's situation, and they cannot
escape responsibility for their failure to perform that duty
merely because of intervening acts the likelihood of which
they reasonable should have foreseen. In regard to Jack's
conduct in leaving the chemicals in the car, there was evidence
that defendants failed to give his adequate notice of the
extremely dangerous character of the liquids and that he was
unaware that they were dangerous. The jury could have
found that defendants had knowledge that their employees did
not remove the glass jars from their cars at night before
driving for pleasure and that defendant should have foreseen the likelihood of such conduct on the part of Jack on
the night of the accident. As for the intervening negligence
of the unknown driver, the jury could have found, in view
of the frequency of automobile accidents, that defendants
should have foreseen that a third person might cause the
type of accident which occurred."
The principles of the McEvoy case on the questions of
intervening negligence and causation were followed in Benton v. Sloss, 38 Ca1.2d 399 [240 P.2d 575]. There Sloss, a
used car dealer, during sale negotiations with a 19-year-old
boy, Jay Fetters, allowed him to drive an old defective automobile over a weekend. Sloss knew that Jay had no dri ver 's
license. While driving in the country that Sunday afternoon with some other young people, Jay, in an attempt to
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avoid colliding with another vehicle, ran his car off the highway and skidded into a telephone pole, causing injuries to
plaintiffs, who were riding as guests in Jay's car. In affirming a judgment in plaintiffs' favor against Sloss, this court
said at page 405: "Jay's negligent driving was unquestionably a cause of plaintiffs' injuries. Sloss' negligence was also
a cause of those injuries, if it was (J substantial factor in
bringing them about. (McEvoy v. American Pool Corp., 32
Ca1.2d 295, 298 [195 P.2d 783] ; Rest., Torts, § 431.) This
question of fact the trial court resolved in plaintiffs' favor .
• • • The negligent conduct of Jay did not relieve Sloss from
liabtlity, for the likelihood of negligent operation of the
vehicle was one of the hazards that Sloss could reasonably
foresee. (Mosley v. Arden Farms Co., 26 Ca1.2d 213, 219,
220 [157 P.2d 372, 158 A.L.R. 872); McEvoy v. American
Pool Oorp., -supra, 32 Cal.2d 295, 298; Lacy v. Pacific Gas
& Elec. 00.,220 Cal. 97 [29 P.2d 781] ; Opple v. Ray, 208 Ind.
450, 456 [195 N.E. 81] ; see Rest., Torts, § 447.)"
In the light of the foregoing principles, plaintiff properly
maintains that whether the leaving of the key in the ignition
switch of the Stanleys' unlocked car parked on a downtown
street was negligence, and if so, whether it was a proximate
cause of plaintiff's injuries were questions on which reasonable minds might differ, and so were for the jury's determination. The fact that Rawlings' negligent operation of the
ear was itself a proximate cause and was preceded by his
criminal act of theft was not determinative under the circumstances. (Ross v. Hartman, supra, 139 F.2d 14, 16.)
The accident here happened within approximately three miles
from the place where the Stanleys' unlocked car was parked
and about fifteen minutes after the negligent parking. The
leaving of keys in an unlocked car on a public street in a
city's populous district might reasonably be regarded as
almost an invitation to a thief to take it, and its subsequent
negligent operation by the thief in the course of flight might
reasonably be held a foreseeable risk which the owner of the
car assumed in consequenc of his negligent act. (Rest.,
Torts, §§ 448, 449.) Any language in the cases of Ra1e v.
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 42 Cal.App. 55, 59 [183 P. 280], and
Frace v. Long Beach Oity High Sch. Diat., 58 Cal.App.2d
566, 572 [137 P.2d 60], indicating a contrary view shonld be
disapproved. (See H Proximate Oause in Oalifornia" by
William L. Prosser, 38 Cal.L.Rev. 369, 372.)
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The general rule of tort liability is applicable in this case:
that if an injury occurs from two causes. both due to the negli.
gence of different persons, but together constituting an effi·
cient cause, a11 persons whose acts contribute to the injury
are liable therefor, and the negligence of one does not excuse
the negligence of the other. (38 Am.Jur. § 70, p. 726; Morns
v. Bolling (Tenn.App.), supra, 218 S.W.2d 754, 758.) Having created the risk by the negligent parking of his car, the
owner may fairly be held responsible for the harm caused
thereby rather than be absolved, as a matter of Law, from all
liability to the innocent victim of his original wrongdoing.
(Ross v. Hartman, supra, 139 F.2d 14. 16.) Such conclusion
accords with the general rule that ordinarily the "issue of
proximate cause is essentially one of fact" (iVosley v. Arden
Farms Co., supra, 26 Ca1.2d 213. 219) and follows the sound
reasoning of Ross v. Hartman, supra, 139 F.2d 14, cert. den.
321 U.S. 790; SclLaff v. R. W. Claxton, Inc., supra, 144 F.
2d 532; Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, 117 N.E.2d 74; and
other like cases above cited wherein the question here presented
has been adjudicated.
It is significant to note that the majority opinion appar·
ently concedes that an owner may be held liable under some
circumstances for the negligent driving of the automobile
by a thief resulting from the negligent leaving of an unlocked
car upon the street. It mentions the situation where an un·
locked car is left in front of a school (Rest., Torts, § 302,
illus. 7) and the situation where a car is left unlocked with
an intoxicated passenger therein. (Morris v. Bolling (Tenn.
App.), supra, 218 S.W.2d 754.) But if any of these situations
presents a question of fact for the jury, it would seem to
follow that a similar question of fact is presented where the
car is left unlocked on a public street during rush hours in
the business district of a populous city. In any event, the
result of the trial court's rulings here was to prevent the
amendment of the complaint or the introduction of any evidence to show the circumstances. It therefore appears that
even under the theory of the majority, the challenged judg·
ment cannot be affirmed.
I would reverse the judgment.
Carter, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied July 7,
1954. Carter,.J.. and Spence, J., were of the opmion that the
petition should be granted.
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